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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few decades, land use planning and urban 
development practices increasingly have come to prioritize 
“planning for density.” Put differently, government officials at all 
levels have embraced the goal of promoting and developing dense, 
mixed-land-use, walkable urban environments, rather than 
dispersed, sprawling single-land-use, auto-dependent suburban 
ones. The trend is perhaps most evident in efforts to densify and 
redevelop center cities, although many suburban communities, 
both old and new, also have embraced the goal of planning for 
density and revised their planning practices accordingly. 
The planning for density toolkit is expansive, spanning both 
mandatory rules and voluntary incentives. These tools include: 
smart-growth and growth-management policies that seek to direct 
new development into built-up areas and restrict new suburban 
development;1 regional government devices that aim to address 
interlocal inequities and rationalize development within 
metropolitan areas;2 urban development efforts, including tax 
                                                                                                                                         
* John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. The 
ideas in this Article were originally presented at the Spring 2017 Environmental 
Distinguished Lecture at Florida State University College of Law. I am grateful to the 
Program on Environmental, Energy, and Land Use Law for inviting me to deliver the 
lecture and to the Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law for agreeing to publish a 
paper based upon my remarks. 
1. See, e.g., About Smart Growth, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ 
smartgrowth/about-smart-growth#smartgrowth (last visited Jan. 1, 2018); APA  
Policy Guide on Smart Growth, AM. PLAN. ASS’N (Apr. 14, 2012), 
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm. 
2. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR 
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); NEAL R. PEIRCE WITH CURTIS W. JOHNSON & JOHN 
STUART HALL, CITISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD 
(1993); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1136–41 (1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the 
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increment financing and other economic development incentives, 
urban infill, and brownfield remediation efforts;3 and “new 
urbanist” planning and development practices, including 
innovative and increasingly popular regulatory alternatives to 
Euclidian zoning.4 None of this is to say that we do not continue to 
build sprawling suburbs, because we certainly do. But it is to say 
that both regulators and developers are more focused—or at least 
focused with more intentionality—on density than they were in 
past generations. 
Proponents of planning for density argue that it holds many 
promises—economic, ecological, and social5—but they tend to 
disregard or dismiss the reality that there are perils and 
paradoxes associated with these practices as well. In this essay, I 
explore these perils and paradoxes. I do so as a proponent of urban 
density. In the interest of full disclosure, I grew up in suburban 
Kansas City, and I understand and respect Americans’ affinity for 
suburbia. But I have—to the befuddlement of my suburbanite 
family members—come to consider myself a convert to urbanism.6 
An authentic religious conversion usually entails a careful study of 
a new faith—including the confrontation and engagement with its 
limitations and failings—that leads to the conviction that it holds 
the truth despite its flaws. The same, I think, is true of a 
conversion to urbanism. I have written extensively about how land 
use planning, policing, and education policies can be employed to 
help urban communities thrive.7 This work has led to the 
                                                                                                                                         
Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 
1985, 2034–37 (2000). 
3. See generally NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, 
AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 82–85 (2010) [hereinafter GARNETT, ORDERING 
THE CITY]; Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the 
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65 (2010); Empowerment Zones, 
Renewal and Enterprise Communities, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,  
https://egis-hud.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/23a64021cec34a8d99b159a58c535d0d_0  
(last visited Jan. 1, 2018); Overview of the Brownfields Program, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-brownfields-program (last visited Jan. 1, 2018); 
Urban Infill and Brownfield Redevelopment, SUSTAINABLE CITIES INST., NAT’L. LEAGUE OF 
CITIES (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.nlc.org/resource/urban-infill-brownfields-redevelopment. 
4. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 
580 n.34 (2013). See also What is New Urbanism?, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, 
https://www.cnu.org/resources/what-new-urbanism (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (summarizing 
the principles of new urbanism). 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. My husband and I live what passes for an “urban” life in South Bend, Indiana. We 
have chosen to raise our family in a modest, century-old house located less than a mile from 
both the university where I work and downtown South Bend; our children have all attended 
an urban Catholic parish school founded more than 150 years ago. 
7. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 3, at 83–87; MARGARET F. BRINIG & NICOLE STELLE 
GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, LOST COMMUNITY: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS’ IMPORTANCE IN URBAN 
AMERICA 2–4 (2014); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle 
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conviction that the only successful way to promote policies that 
encourage density and urban vitality is to face the reality that 
these practices are not costless—and to find ways to address their 
costs. That is, I have come to believe that the case for density must 
reflect both a conviction that density is worth promoting and an 
understanding that planning for density is hardly a panacea. In 
other words, we need to be smarter about smart growth. 
This essay proceeds in three parts. The first briefly describes 
the social, economic, ecological, and political dynamics fueling the 
trend toward planning for density. This section focuses, in 
particular, on the motivations of those promoting the tools in the 
planning-for-density toolkit, outlining the promises that 
proponents argue that these tools hold. The second addresses the 
perils of mandatory planning devices that seek to achieve density. 
The final section discusses a paradox of planning for diversity that 
virtually nobody considers, but which I believe may offer a path 
forward. 
 
II. THE PROMISES OF PLANNING FOR DENSITY 
 
The current focus on planning for density results from the 
confluence of a number of factors. The first is the fact that elite 
residential preferences, especially among young professionals, 
increasingly have come—for a variety of reasons—to favor urban 
life.8 These shifting preferences have fueled an urban comeback in 
some cities,9 leading many urban leaders to focus on building the 
                                                                                                                                         
Class City, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 202–04 (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the 
Urban Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995, 1998–99 (2012); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering 
(and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2004); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating 
Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1077–81 (2005); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop 
the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. 598, 621–25 (2006); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2012) [hereinafter The People Paradox]. 
8. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the 
Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275 (2006) (attributing the increased desire to live in urban 
areas to a rise in income and education levels and a decline in crime rates). 
9. See, e.g., Joe Cortright, Surging City Center Job Growth, CITY OBSERVATORY 1–2 
(Feb. 2015), http://cityobservatory.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Surging-City-Center-
Jobs.pdf; Melanie Eversley, Hard-Knocks Cities Are Working on a Comeback, USA TODAY 
(July 24, 2014, 10:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/24/cities-
visitors-campaigns/12202367/; Richey Piiparinen, The Rust Bend “Comeback”: To What?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2017, 6:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-rust-
belt-comeback-to-what_us_5890e681e4b080b3dad6fc81; Richard Voith & Susan  
Wachter, The Return of America’s Cities: Economic Rebound and the Future of  
America’s Urban Centers, PENN INST. FOR URB. RES. (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://penniur.upenn.edu/publications/the-return-of-americas-cities. But see Jacob Anbinder, 
Fool for the City: How We’re Over-hyping America’s Urban Comeback, THE  
WEEK (Mar. 5, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/542508/fool-city-how-overhyping-americas-
urban-comeback. 
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kinds of communities that will attract what Richard Florida has 
called the “creative class.”10 The second is the environmental 
movement, which has raised awareness about the ecological effects 
of sprawling suburban development, spurring the development of 
federal and state environmental initiatives as well as the “smart 
growth” movement and the regulatory tools associated with it.11 
The third is the regional government movement, which promotes 
policies, including growth management, that aim to mute the 
importance of local government boundaries and emphasizes the 
need for greater coordination among local government within 
metropolitan areas—especially with respect to land use planning.12 
And the fourth is the growing influence of the new urbanists, a 
loosely affiliated group of planners, architects, and lawyers who 
promote both urban design practices and regulatory alternatives to 
traditional Euclidean zoning practices.13 
Not surprisingly, the articulated promises of planning for 
density map neatly onto the forces motivating the trend. For urban 
leaders, planning for density is a marketing strategy. As one 
commentator noted over a decade ago, urban leaders in cities large 
and small find themselves “[o]n a hunt for ways to put sex in the 
city.”14 They seek to build the kind of communities—urban, mixed-
use, and diverse—that they believe will attract elite,  
well-educated, hip, young, and affluent residents. The reasoning 
behind this ambition traces its roots to Richard Florida’s 
enormously influential book, The Rise of the Creative Class. 
Florida argues, in this book and others, that the modern economy 
is increasingly fueled by “creative” people who are attracted to 
“creative centers” that provide “the integrated eco-system or 
habitat where all forms of creativity—artistic and cultural, 
technological and economic—can take root and flourish.”15 Cities, 
                                                                                                                                         
10. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW IT’S 
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002) [hereinafter 
FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS]; RICHARD FLORIDA, THE FLIGHT OF THE 
CREATIVE CLASS: THE NEW GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR TALENT (2007) [hereinafter FLORIDA, 
THE FLIGHT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS]. 
11. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 224 (2004); 
DOUGLAS FARR, SUSTAINABLE URBANISM: URBAN DESIGN WITH NATURE (2007). 
12. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 2, at 1147–50; ORFIELD, supra note 2, at 123–24; 
DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 70 (1993). 
13. See What is New Urbanism?, supra note 4. 
14. John Leland, On a Hunt for Ways to Put Sex in the City, N.Y. TIMES,  
Dec. 11, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/11/garden/on-a-hunt-for-ways-to-put-sex-in-
the-city.html. 
15. FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 10, at 218. Accord 
FLORIDA, THE FLIGHT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 10; RICHARD FLORIDA, WHO’S 
YOUR CITY?: HOW THE CREATIVE ECONOMY IS MAKING WHERE TO LIVE THE MOST IMPORTANT 
DECISION IN YOUR LIFE 116–20 (2008) [hereinafter FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY?]. 
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Florida argues, “have become the prime location for the creative 
lifestyle and the new amenities that go with it.”16 Florida’s 
arguments have been sharply criticized,17 and the extent of 
America’s urban comeback remains contested.18 But these disputes 
have not tempered the enthusiasm of urban leaders for 
“densification”—a reality reflected in, among other trends, the 
adoption of “new urbanist” land use regulations discussed below.19 
Environmentalists focus on the ecological promises of planning 
for density.20 They argue that “smart growth” regulations that 
channel growth back into urban centers and older suburbs (and 
restrict new development on the urban fringe) will help preserve 
greenfields and valuable agricultural lands,21 protect wetlands and 
other sensitive habitats,22 maintain biodiversity,23 and reduce 
greenhouse gases.24 
For regional government proponents, planning for density is a 
means of addressing the inefficiencies and inequalities that 
                                                                                                                                         
16. FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 10, at 287. 
17. See, e.g., JOEL KOTKIN, THE HUMAN CITY: URBANISM FOR THE REST OF US (2016) 
(questioning the evidence supporting Florida’s conclusions); David Brooks, Where America is 
Working, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/where-
america-is-working.html?mcubz=3; Ian David Moss, Deconstructing Richard Florida, 
CREATEQUITY (Apr. 27, 2009) http://createquity.com/2009/04/deconstructing-richard-florida/. 
But cf. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS: HOW OUR CITIES ARE INCREASING 
INEQUALITY, DEEPENING SEGREGATION, AND FAILING THE MIDDLE CLASS—AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT (2017) [hereinafter FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS] (recognizing that 
the benefits of urbanism are not equally distributed); Max Heninger, 
 A New Urban Crisis, REAL CLEAR POLICY (Jan. 4, 2017) 
http://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2017/01/04/a_new_urban_crisis_110129.html 
(recognizing the competing views of Florida and Kotkin). 
18. See, e.g., Anbinder, supra note 9. 
19. See infra notes 44–45 and text accompanying notes. 
20. See generally David Dodman, Urban Form, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Climate Vulnerability, in POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 64–79 (José  
Miguel Guzmán et al. eds., 2009), http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/pop_dynamics_climate_change_0.pdf; Michael P. Johnson, Environmental Impacts of 
Urban Sprawl: A Survey of the Literature and Proposed Research Agenda, 33 ENV’T & PLAN. 
A 717 (2001); APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, supra note 1; Sprawl Overview, SIERRA 
CLUB, http://vault.sierraclub.org/sprawl/overview/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). 
21. See, e.g., APA Policy Guide on Agricultural Land Preservation, AM. PLAN. ASS’N, 
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/agricultural.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). 
22. See, e.g., William E. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism and the Problem of 
Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 74–75 (1999). 
23. See, e.g., Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145, 
169–75 (2002); Study Shows Urban Sprawl Threatens Genetic Diversity, THE SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 2010, 6:00 AM, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-
urbanization-threatens-genetic-diversity-species-2010sep22-story.html. 
24. See, e.g., Christopher Jones & Daniel M. Kammen, Spatial Distribution of U.S. 
Carbon Footprints Reveals Suburbanization Undermines Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Urban 
Population Density, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 895 (2014) (finding that dense urban centers 
contribute less greenhouse-gas emissions per person than other areas of the country, but 
these cities’ extensive suburbs wipe out their climate benefits). 
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pervade our metropolitan areas.25 Proponents of regional 
government assume that suburbs are places of exit.26 According to 
this account, suburbanites abandoned cities (often motivated by 
racism);27 municipal incorporation laws shield suburbs from 
annexation;28 exclusionary suburban land use policies prevent the 
exit of poor urban residents;29 and exiters saddle urban 
governments with the burden of addressing (but not the resources 
to address) the myriad woes of poverty.30 The never-ending  
cycle of new suburban development also necessitates  
wasteful development of new infrastructure (while older, urban 
infrastructure decays or lies fallow), reduces the opportunities for 
interlocal cooperation, and prevents local governments from 
capitalizing on economies of scale.31 
Regionalists argue that suburbanites remain, in important 
respects, part of the urban polity, reasoning that the suburbs 
where they live are intertwined socially and economically with the 
center cities.32 According to this view, suburbanites are essentially 
economic “leeches” that reap the benefits of cities without 
contributing in any meaningful way to supporting them.33 For 
regionalists, economic and social justice mandate planning for 
density, especially through regional growth management tools that 
                                                                                                                                         
25. See supra note 2. 
26. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 277 (2007). 
27. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 256 (1993) 
(“[M]illions of people have escaped city problems by crossing the boundary between city and 
suburb . . . segregat[ing] many of America’s metropolitan areas into ‘two nations’: rich and 
poor, white and black, expanding and contracting.”); Cashin, supra note 2, at 2015 
(“[F]ragmented political borders were . . . the result of economic, social, and racial 
differentiation—a locational sorting process . . . .”). 
28. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1141–44. 
29. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
PROPERTY LINES 42–60 (2009); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1047, 1048 (1996). 
30. See ORFIELD, supra note 2, at 2 (“Throughout the United States, people move ‘up 
and out,’ taking their economic and social resources with them and leaving behind an 
increasingly dense core of poverty in the city and rapidly growing social needs in older 
suburbs.”). 
31. See PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 97–99; Briffault, supra note 2, at 1147–50; Clayton P. 
Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 204–06 (2001). 
32. The continued importance of center cities is supported by substantial evidence 
linking overall regional health with center-city fortunes, see RUSK, supra note 12, at 72–73, 
and suggests that commuters to city jobs tend to have higher wages than suburban 
employees, Gillette, supra note 31, at 241–42. 
33. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 443 (1990) (asserting that suburbanites routinely deny that “[t]he city 
was the primary center of jobs and commercial and cultural institutions for the region”); 
Gillette, supra note 31, at 241 (“[S]uburbanites exploit the central city by taking advantage 
of the cultural and commercial benefits . . . but then retreat without contributing to the 
services necessary to provide those benefits and without redressing the social problems 
endemic to cities.”). 
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direct new development back into built-up areas. Encouraging (or 
requiring) urban redevelopment is embraced as a way to right the 
wrongs wrought by our fragmented system of local government, 
build more inclusive and just communities, and improve the 
educational and economic prospects of the urban poor.34 
And then there are the new urbanists. I want to spend just a 
bit more time on them, both because they are not well-known 
outside of land use circles and because their growing influence on 
land use regulation is underappreciated. The new urbanism is also 
central to the paradox of planning for density. The new urbanists 
are a loosely affiliated group of architects and urban planning 
professionals who promote the development of—and the adoption 
of legal rules that mandate the development of—mixed-land-use 
“urban” neighborhoods.35 The new urbanists’ claim builds, in 
important ways, upon Jane Jacobs's enormously influential book, 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities.36 Jacobs wrote at the 
apex of the urban renewal period, when urban planning ideology 
strongly favored the imposition of single-land-use patterns on our 
cities, even to the point of demolishing mixed-land-use 
communities in order to replace them with single-land-use ones. 
She vehemently rejected the accepted wisdom that dense urban 
neighborhoods were antiquated and unhealthy.37 On the contrary, 
she argued that mixed-land-use neighborhoods are critical to city 
life, because commercial land uses both generate social capital and 
guarantee a steady supply of “eyes upon the street” to monitor and 
keep disorder and crime in check.38 
The new urbanists embrace many of the environmentalists’ 
and regionalists’ arguments, but they argue that planning for 
density has cultural and aesthetic benefits as well. Their case 
against Euclidean zoning is part anti-suburban polemic and part 
pro-urban philosophy. At heart, the new urbanists’ claim is that 
cities are good for us, and suburbs are bad.39 They are bad for two 
                                                                                                                                         
34. See Frug, supra note 27, at 279–81, 294–99. 
35. See Charter of the New Urbanism, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM (2001), 
https://www.cnu.org/who-we-are/charter-new-urbanism (stating the principles of the new 
urbanism); What is CNU?, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/who-we-
are (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (same); see also GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING 
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 149–54 (1999) (describing the principles of the new 
urbanism). 
36. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 
(1961). 
37. Id. at 3–25. 
38. Id. at 34–38. 
39. See, e.g., LÉON KRIER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY 104 (Dhiru A. Thadani 
& Peter J. Hetzel eds. 2009) (“Functional zoning replaces the organic order of the city with 
the mechanical disorder of the suburbs . . . .”). 
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reasons. First, the new urbanists believe that suburbs are ugly. 
Indeed, they think just about everything built since the Second 
World War that was not designed by new urbanists is ugly.40 
Second, they believe that urban neighborhoods build community. 
Cities, they argue, are as socializing and democratizing as suburbs 
are privatizing. Cities are diverse and vibrant, suburbs monolithic 
and isolating. To put the claim into social-science terminology, the 
new urbanists argue that cities generate social capital by drawing 
together strangers who would not otherwise connect, while 
suburbs inhibit social capital by further privatizing our already-
atomized culture.41 Thus, it follows that zoning laws that mandate 
a single-land-use, “suburban” built environment are antisocial and 
ought to be scrapped.42 The normative claims of new urbanists are 
colorfully summarized by James Howard Kunstler as follows: 
“[T]he model of the human habitat dictated by zoning is a formless, 
soulless, centerless, demoralizing mess. It bankrupts families and 
townships. It causes mental illness. It disables whole classes of 
decent, normal citizens. It ruins the air we breathe. It corrupts and 
deadens our spirits.”43 
Kunstler makes clear that the normative and aesthetic claims 
of the new urbanists are intertwined. New urbanists believe that 
architectural design can cure the social, as well as the aesthetic, 
woes of our culture. Traditional architecture, they argue, is 
friendly and welcoming; suburban architecture is cold and 
privatizing. They love front porches and hate garage doors. This is 
important because, over the last few decades, the new urbanists 
have mounted a remarkably successful public relations campaign 
against traditional zoning practices and the suburban land use 
patterns resulting from them. They also have developed an 
                                                                                                                                         
40. JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 10 (1993) [hereinafter KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
NOWHERE] (“Eighty percent of everything ever built in America has been built in the last 
fifty years, and most of it is depressing, brutal, ugly, unhealthy and spiritually  
degrading . . . .”). 
41. By social capital, I refer here to Robert Putnam’s “lean and mean” definition: 
“[S]ocial networks and the norms of reciprocity . . . that arise from them.” ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000). 
Specifically, the new urbanists claim, to borrow from Putnam, that nonresidential land uses 
are “bridging” institutions—that is, they draw together groups of individuals who might not 
otherwise interact. Id. at 22–24. For a thoughtful discussion of the new urbanism and social 
capital, see Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban 
Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 559–61 (2006). 
42. JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY 
WORLD FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 134–35 (1996) [hereinafter KUNSTLER, HOME FROM 
NOWHERE] (“The public consensus about how to build a human settlement . . . has collapsed. 
Standards of excellence in architecture and town planning have collapsed. . . . What was 
thrown away must now be reconstructed, spelled out, and reinstated.”). 
43. Id. at 112. 
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alternative to zoning laws—“transect zoning”—that seeks to 
impose these aesthetic sensibilities through the law, which local 
governments increasingly are embracing.44 The reach of these 
regulations varies by jurisdiction,45 with a growing number of 
 local governments, including several major cities, choosing to 
implement them comprehensively on a city-wide basis.46 
 
III. THE PERILS OF PLANNING FOR DENSITY 
 
The perils of planning for density are well-understood, if 
contested, and are primarily associated with the coercive (rather 
than the voluntary) regulatory practices in the planning-for-
density toolkit—especially regulations that promote urban density 
by restricting suburban growth. The economics of growth 
management are fairly straightforward. Despite their best efforts, 
land use planners inevitably confront the law of supply and 
demand. Both economic theory and empirical research suggest 
that regulatory limits on new development drive up property 
values and reduce housing affordability.47 Michael Schill succinctly 
summarized the problem as follows: “The Achilles’ heel of the 
‘smart growth’ movement is the impact that many of the proposals 
put forth by its advocates would have on affordable housing.”48 
According to proponents, properly structured, metropolitan- or 
state-wide limits on suburban development are necessary to 
                                                                                                                                         
44. See Tools, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/resources/tools 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2018); CHAD EMERSON & ANDRES DUANY, THE SMARTCODE SOLUTION TO 
SPRAWL (2007). 
45. See Nate Berg, Brave New Codes, ARCHITECT MAG., July 2010, at 50, 51–53, 
http://cdn.coverstand.com/11050/41861/41861.2.pdf. 
46. The cities of Miami, Denver, and Cincinnati have overhauled their existing zoning 
codes in favor of transect-zoning regulations. See, e.g., Dakota Handon & Alex Adams, 
Miami 21: The Blueprint for Miami’s Future, FLA. PLAN. 4 (Winter 2010), 
http://www.fltod.com/research/tod_planning_and_fbc_in_florida/miami_21/miami_21_florida
_planning.pdf; CITY OF MIAMI PLAN. AND ZONING DEP’T, MIAMI21: YOUR CITY, YOUR PLAN, 
www.miami21.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2018); Christopher N. Osher, Denver Council Passes 
Overhaul of City’s Zoning Laws, DENVER POST (June 21, 2010, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2010/06/21/denver-council-passes-overhaul-of-citys-zoning-laws/; 
How Does the Denver Zoning Code Work?, DENVER DEP’T OF COMMUNITY PLAN. AND DEV., 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/community-planning-and-
development/zoning/neighborhood-context.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2018);  
John Yung, Here’s How Cincinnati’s Form-Based Codes are Designed to  
Spur Redevelopment, CINN. BUS. COURIER (Jan. 14, 2014, 9:45 AM) 
http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2014/01/21/heres-how-cincinnatis-form-
based.html. 
47. See, e.g., Shen, infra note 54, at 70 (reviewing empirical studies analyzing the 
price effects of growth controls). 
48. Michael H. Schill, Comment, Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, in GROWTH 
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 102, 102 (Anthony Downs 
ed., 2004). 
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achieve urban density because local government power leads 
inevitably to a tragedy of the commons scenario within a 
metropolitan area.49 Each suburban government jealously guards 
its authority to regulate land use so as to maximize local tax 
revenues (and resident satisfaction).50 More affluent “inner-ring” 
suburbs tend to accomplish these goals through exclusionary 
zoning techniques that freeze out new development, pushing it to 
the suburban fringe.51 Communities located on that fringe, 
recognizing their competitive advantage, have incentives to 
encourage development by relaxing land use standards.52 
Increased sprawl results inevitably from this pattern of exclusion 
and invitation.53 When growth controls are imposed locally, 
therefore, they tend to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, sprawl 
by shifting development to non-controlled areas.54 As William 
Fischel has observed, local growth controls “probably cause 
metropolitan areas to be to spread out . . . [by] caus[ing] developers 
to go to other communities.”55 
For this reason, growth-management and regional government 
proponents alike tend to favor controls imposed at the state or 
regional level, such as the urban growth boundaries imposed in 
Oregon. Proponents argue that regional growth controls can 
counter the inefficiencies described above by channeling new 
development back into declining center cities and saving 
undeveloped land from “cheating” suburbs with lax land use 
                                                                                                                                         
49. See, e.g., ARTHUR C. NELSON & JAMES B. DUNCAN WITH CLANCY J. MULLEN & KIRK 
R. BISHOP, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 19 (1993) (“Regional 
approaches to planning and growth management issues have long been championed as a 
necessary alternative to the problems associated with fragmented, uncoordinated, and 
competitive local government policies.”). 
50. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 33, at 349 (noting that “local government law does 
not distinguish within the category of municipal corporation between city and suburb”); id. 
at 366 (linking suburban autonomy and local land use regulation); Briffault, supra note 2, at 
1134–35. 
51. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1135–36 (noting that affluent communities use 
exclusionary zoning to preserve high tax base); Frug, supra note 29, at 1083–84 (describing 
use of exclusionary zoning). 
52. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1135 (attributing “‘leapfrog’ pattern of development” 
to exclusionary zoning in central suburbs that forces new development to outer-ring suburbs 
with more favorable political climates); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, DO GROWTH CONTROLS 
MATTER? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION 55 (1990). 
53. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Linda Kirts Davis, Saving the Land: The Utilization 
of Modern Techniques of Growth Management to Preserve Rural and Agricultural America, 
13 URB. L. 27, 30–31 (1981). 
54. See, e.g., Q Shen, Spatial Impacts of Locally Enacted Growth Controls: The San 
Francisco Bay Region in the 1980s, 23 ENV’T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 61, 86 (1996). 
55. FISCHEL, supra note 52, at 55. 
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regulations.56 Unfortunately, centralized growth management 
policies likely exacerbate their price effects. One benefit of the 
traditional pattern of exclusion and invitation described above is 
that new growth on the suburban fringe tends to mitigate the price 
effects of growth controls in inner suburbs.57 Sprawl, in turn, 
promotes the housing filtering process, by which a wealthier 
individual moving to a larger house sets off a “chain of successive 
housing moves” that increases the availability of quality housing 
for poor and moderate-income individuals.58 We might therefore 
expect comprehensive growth management, more than local 
controls, to increase overall regional housing prices.59 
Regional government proponents counter that centralized 
control over development policy can actually increase the 
affordability of housing overall,60 by curtailing local governments’ 
exclusionary tendencies.61 This is because regional growth policies 
not only limit exclusionary zoning, but also often incorporate 
planning tools (such as housing linkage, inclusionary zoning, 
density bonuses, and impact-fee waivers) designed to increase the 
supply of affordable housing.62 Perhaps. But even assuming that 
policymakers muster the political will to implement  
affordability-promotion tools on a large enough scale to counter the 
                                                                                                                                         
56. See, e.g., id. at 30 (arguing that growth controls would “benefit central city 
dwellers through rehabilitation and revitalization of the central city” and “would be 
environmentally beneficial by preserving agricultural land and open space”); William B. 
Shore, Recentralization: The Single Answer to More Than a Dozen Unites States Problems 
and a Major Answer to Poverty, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 496 (1995). 
57. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs? 116 YALE L.J. 598, 
605–609 (2006) (reviewing literature). 
58. Brian J.L. Berry, Ghetto Expansion and Single-Family Housing Prices: Chicago, 
1968–1972, 3 J. URB. ECON. 397, 417 (1976) (arguing that suburbanization led to a massive 
chain of moves, which mitigated the price effects of racial discrimination in Chicago and 
enabled many families to improve their housing situation). 
59. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509–28 (1991) (arguing that 
competition between municipalities may reduce their ability to exact concessions from 
developers); Arthur C. Nelson et al., The Link between Growth Management and Housing 
Affordability: The Academic Evidence, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 127–28 (predicting that regional growth management 
policies will have greater price effects than will local ones, which permit housing consumers 
to migrate to uncontrolled jurisdictions). 
60. See, e.g., GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE: 
LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 52–58 (1992) (discussing conflicting 
evidence on the price effects of Oregon’s comprehensive growth management program). 
61. Metropolitan fragmentation undoubtedly permits local governments to dress up 
exclusionary zoning in a growth-management gown. After all, limits on all new development 
serve the double purpose of excluding disfavored land uses (and questionable new 
neighbors) and making existing homes a scarcer, and therefore more valuable, resource. See, 
e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 
139, 146 (2005) (discussing literature). 
62. Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, in 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT?, 86–100. 
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regressive effects of growth management—a big “if,” in my 
opinion—the transitional fairness questions raised by suburban 
growth restrictions remain. These concerns are not limited to 
housing affordability. Even if a regional development strategy 
succeeded in holding constant the overall cost of housing, most 
affordable housing would likely continue to be found in center 
cities and older suburbs.63 After all, regional growth-management 
strategies aim to channel new development into built-up areas. 
Yet, as Robert Bruegmann highlights in his excellent history of 
suburban sprawl, urban life has always been most difficult for the 
poor, and suburbs have long represented the urban poor’s hope for 
a better life.64 The reality is that suburbs offer the good schools, 
economic opportunities, and environmental amenities that wealthy 
urban dwellers can afford to purchase and poorer ones  
cannot65—realities that Richard Florida himself acknowledges in a 
recent book.66 
Moreover, and in my view more importantly, there is 
something slightly unseemly about dramatically curtailing 
suburban growth at a time when racial minorities are responsible 
for the lion’s share of suburban population gains in many major 
metropolitan areas.67 A majority of Asian Americans, half of 
Hispanic Americans, and nearly forty percent of African 
Americans are now suburbanites.68 Efforts to channel development 
into the urban core could slow or reverse this trend, which is 
fueling increased suburban racial diversity. This risk is especially 
pronounced because many of the most diverse neighborhoods have 
characteristics that draw the ire of sprawl opponents: they are 
located in low-density metropolitan areas in the West and 
Southwest and filled with relatively low cost “starter homes.”69 It 
is difficult to avoid concluding that changing the rules of the 
development game at this time is tantamount to pulling the 
suburban ladder out from under those late exiters who  
                                                                                                                                         
63. See Schill, supra note 48, at 104. 
64. See ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 26–29 (2005). 
65. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2102–08 (2002) (discussing the connection between economic status and 
educational achievement); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner-City Poor, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 795, 811–31 (1991) (advocating policies that help the urban poor move to 
suburbs). 
66. See FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS, supra note 17. 
67. WILLIAM H. FREY, Melting Pot Suburbs: A Study of Suburban Diversity, in 1 
REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 155, 163 
(Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003). 
68. Id. at 167–74. 
69. See Been, supra note 61, at 164 (“[N]ew neighborhoods of starter homes are more 
racially mixed than established neighborhoods.” (citation omitted)). 
Fall, 2017] PLANNING FOR DENSITY 13 
 
previously were excluded from suburban life by  
economic circumstance, exclusionary zoning, and—in some  
cases—intentional discrimination. Moreover, the primary 
advantages of growth management imposed in the name of 
planning for density may be enjoyed by individuals who have 
perpetrated, or at least benefited from, this past exclusion: that is, 
the current suburban homeowners who are the immediate 
beneficiaries of the economic and environmental amenities that 
attend growth controls.70 
The new urbanists promise that their regulatory alternative to 
Euclidean zoning promotes density while avoiding or mitigating 
the economic perils of growth controls by “simplifying” land use 
regulation.71 New urbanists argue that cities should reject  
use-based zoning regulations in favor of a system of form-based 
aesthetic controls that governs the appropriate form of buildings in 
a given neighborhood.72 Their regulatory alternative to zoning 
finds its roots in architect Andrés Duany’s 2003 SmartCode. New 
urbanist codes flow from the assumption that urban development 
proceeds naturally from more-dense areas to less-dense ones.73 
Duany calls this progression the “transect” and urges cities to 
replace traditional use zoning with regulations on building form 
appropriate to the various “transect zones” along the progression.74 
Most cities’ transect-zoning schemes, by and large, have adopted 
this formula (depicted in Figure 1 below), which assumes a natural 
progression of urban development from more to less dense.75 
                                                                                                                                         
70. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 
86 YALE L.J. 385, 400 (1977) (“Antigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries: 
those who already own residential structures in the municipality doing the excluding.”). 
Although the evidence is mixed, some studies show a correlation between levels of home 
ownership and support for growth controls. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN 
PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICA 95 (1986) (finding strong 
correlation between home ownership and support for limiting apartment construction); Alan 
Gin & Jonathan Sandy, Evaluating the Demand for Residential Growth Controls, 3 J. 
HOUSING ECON. 109 (1994) (support for growth controls increases with rates of home 
ownership). But see Mark Baldassare & Georjeanna Wilson, Changing Sources of Suburban 
Support for Local Growth Controls, 33 URB. STUD. 459, 462 (1996) (evidence on correlation 
mixed). 
71. See DANIEL G. PAROLEK ET AL., FORM-BASED CODES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, 
URBAN DESIGNERS, MUNICIPALITIES, AND DEVELOPERS 4, 39 (2008) (arguing that new 
urbanist codes ought to be “simple” and short). 
72. Id. at 12 (describing form-based codes as a method to regulate new-urbanist-style 
development by controlling physical form rather than land use). 
73. See ANDRÉS DUANY ET AL., SMARTCODE: VERSION 9.2, at vi–vii (2012). 
74. Id. at xi; Andrés Duany & Emily Talen, Transect Planning, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 
245, 245–48 (2002). 
75. The Transect, CTR. FOR APPLIED TRANSECT STUD., http://transect.org/transect.html 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (“Before the automobile, American development patterns were 
walkable, and transects within towns and city neighborhoods revealed areas that were less 
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Figure 1. The Urban Transect76 
 
 
 
Drawing upon this concept, proponents of transect zoning urge 
regulators to scrap traditional zoning codes, which regulate based 
upon property uses, in favor of a regulatory system that targets 
building density and form.77 Proponents of transect zoning argue 
that the codes defining the appropriate building forms along the 
transect—known in the vernacular as “form-based codes”—ought 
to be “simple” and short.78 Unfortunately, while new urbanists 
echo Jacobs’ embrace of urban land use patterns, their preferred 
method for achieving them departs from her relatively libertarian 
belief that cities thrive best when government leaves them alone.79 
As implemented, neither the new urbanism nor the new urbanists’ 
regulatory alternative to zoning is a libertarian project. On the 
contrary, to borrow from Vicki Been and Bob Ellickson’s 
description of building codes, form-based codes can be “technical 
document[s], whose level of difficulty at places may rival that of 
the Internal Revenue Code.”80 New urbanists have specific ideas 
about how buildings should look: they should not only be 
architecturally appropriate, but also attractive, indeed welcoming, 
in their details.81 Many form-based codes favor “traditional” 
                                                                                                                                         
urban and more urban in character. This urbanism could be analyzed as natural transects 
are analyzed.”). 
76. Id. 
77. PAROLEK ET AL., supra note 71, at 18–19. 
78. Id. at 39. 
79. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 73, at iv (“[The SmartCode] is meant to be  
law . . . administered by municipal planning departments and interpreted by elected 
representatives of local government.”); Form-Based Codes Defined, FORM-BASED CODES 
INST., https://formbasedcodes.org/definition/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (“[F]orm-based codes 
are regulatory, not advisory.”). 
80. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 447 (3d ed. 2005). 
81. See generally KRIER, supra note 39 (discussing architecture and urbanism). 
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building designs—that is, those reminiscent of the pre-zoning 
communities that new urbanists champion as a planning ideal. 
And, while most new urbanists argue that form-based codes are 
distinct from architectural regulations, in practice, many form-
based codes mandate architectural design elements.82 
There are both practical and theoretical reasons why 
architectural details pervade transect-zoning regulations. 
Practically, determining which building “forms” belong in a given 
transect zone is not a self-evident proposition, but rather, must be 
spelled out in architectural codes, such as the one reproduced 
above in Figure 1.83 Moreover, detailed architectural restrictions 
may placate groups that are resistant to regulatory changes 
enabling density and a mixing of land uses—particularly, 
homeowners concerned about protecting their property values from 
externalities that nonresidential land uses may generate.84 
Theoretically, many new urbanists believe that our society’s idea of 
what constitutes “good” urban environments has been corrupted by 
decades of zoning. Therefore, they believe that pervasive and 
comprehensive government regulation is required in order to 
mandate those environments. As James Howard Kunstler argues, 
“The[se] codes will invoke in words and graphic images standards 
of excellence that previously existed in the minds of ordinary 
citizens but which have been forgotten and forsaken. The codes, 
therefore, aim to restore the collective cultural consciousness.”85 
Not surprisingly, therefore, form-based codes frequently impose 
high compliance costs. These costs flow in large part from the 
imposition of architectural standards, which, at a minimum, 
require securing the services of an architect to ensure compliance, 
but may also require expensive building materials.86 This extra 
                                                                                                                                         
82. See Berg, supra note 45, at 51–53. 
83. See Elizabeth Garvin & Dawn Jourdan, Through the Looking Glass: Analyzing the 
Potential Legal Challenges to Form-Based Codes, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 404–06 
(2008); Kenny Be, Everybody Must Get Zoned: Kenny Be Looks at Denver’s New Zoning 
Rules, WESTWORD (Jan. 20, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/everybody-
must-get-zoned-kenny-be-looks-at-denvers-new-zoning-rules-5879939#page-1 (“[A]t 730 
pages, not including 76 neighborhood maps and six Overlay District maps, the new zoning 
code is being called an improvement. It is a control-freak fantasy, with detailed rules for 
every aspect of city life.”). 
84. GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY, supra note 3, at 200–201. 
85. KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE, supra note 42 at 135. 
86. See Ajay Garde, Designing and Developing New Urbanist Projects in the United 
States: Insights and Implications, 11 J. OF URB. DESIGN 33, 43–44 (2006) (noting that 
architectural features, materials and highly detailed design codes are cost burdens 
associated with new urbanism); Yan Song & Mark Stevens, The Economics of New 
Urbanism and Smart Growth: Comparing Price Gains and Costs Between New Urbanists 
and Conventional Developments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF URBAN ECONOMICS AND  
PLANNING 503, 513–19 (Nancy Brooks et al. eds., 2012). 
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layer of difficulty supplements pre-existing regulations of “building 
form,” including building codes and the accessibility regulations  
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).87 Moreover, the  
public-choice realities discussed above often require that  
form-based codes supplement, rather than supplant, pre-existing 
zoning regulations and growth controls.88 Essentially, these codes 
are the equivalent of a highly technical performance-zoning 
overlay.89 Not only are new urbanist developments more expensive 
than conventional ones,90 but compliance costs have stalled some 
redevelopment efforts governed by form-based zoning.91 In other 
                                                                                                                                         
87. See, e.g., CNTY. OF SANTA BARBARA PLANNING & DEV. DEP’T, LOS ALAMOS BELL 
STREET DESIGN GUIDELINES 24 (2011) (mandating that ramps and guiderails should 
complement the overall design intent while conforming with existing building code and ADA 
requirements). For a discussion of general building costs associated with ADA compliance, 
see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 80, at 452. 
88. See Kaizer Rangwala, Hybrid Codes Versus Form-Based Codes, NEW URB. NEWS, 
Apr.–May 2009, at 12, 13 (noting that, despite plans for city-wide form-based codes, limited 
resources, development, and political pressures forced officials to adopt hybrid codes or 
overlay districts in Phoenix and Ventura); see also DONALD L. ELLIOTT, A BETTER WAY TO 
ZONE: TEN PRINCIPLES TO CREATE MORE LIVABLE CITIES 37–38 (2008) (asserting that form-
based codes are likely to supplement rather than replace conventional zoning because of 
lack of time, money, and political support); John M. Barry, Form Based Codes: Measured 
Success Through Both Mandatory and Optional Implementation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 305, 331 
(2008) (offering parallel form-based codes that supplement conventional zoning as a solution 
when there is public opposition to mandatory form-based codes). 
89. Performance zoning regulates land use by establishing parameters designed to 
limit the negative impact of the use. Although performance zoning is more flexible than 
conventional zoning, it is often difficult to administer and no major city has replaced 
Euclidean zoning in favor of performance zoning. See ELLIOTT, supra note 88, at 23–26; 
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 101–02 (2d ed. 2007). For an example of a highly detailed 
form-based overlay, see Jeremy E. Sharp, An Examination of the Form-Based  
Code and Its Application to the Town of Blacksburg 20–21 (Nov. 4, 2004)  
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), 
https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/37154/SharpFINALmajorpaper.pdf?se
quence=1&isAllowed=y (noting that South Miami’s highly detailed form-based overlay 
regulates the uses on each floor of buildings in the urban zone). 
90. See, e.g., Joseph E. Gyourko & Witold Rybczynski, Financing New Urbanism 
Projects: Obstacles and Solutions, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 733, 739–40 (2000) 
(concluding, based on an extensive survey of builders and developers, that new urbanist 
projects are more expensive); Philip Langdon, The Not-So-Secret Code: Across the U.S., 
Form-Based Codes Are Putting New Urbanist Ideas into Practice, AM. PLAN. ASS’N  
(Jan. 2006) (asserting that the cost of form-based codes “exceeds that of a conventional land-
use plan” making citywide form-based coding “prohibitively expensive”). 
91. See GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY, supra note 3, at 176–180; Ed Tombari, The 
Future of Zoning?, 22 LAND DEV. 23, 25 (2009) (noting development drawbacks to Arlington, 
Virginia’s form-based overlay that include having to go back to the Planning Board in order 
to make minor facade changes); Mark Simpson, Cost and Business Resistance Kill Orlando 
Suburb Beautification and Traffic Calming Effort, WNYC: TRANS. NATION (Apr. 2, 2011), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/285835-cost-and-business-resistance-kill-orlando-suburb-
beautification-and-traffic-calming-effort/ (noting the cost of a form-based redevelopment 
project as a reason for its rejection); Robert Steuteville, Survey: Combine New Code with 
Activities and Investment, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM: PUB. SQUARE (Apr. 1, 2010), 
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/survey-combine-new-code-activities-and-investment 
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words, new urbanist regulation may exacerbate, rather than 
mitigate, the economic effects of achieving urban density through 
growth management. 
 
IV. THE PARADOX OF PLANNING FOR DENSITY 
 
I come at last to the paradox of planning for density, a paradox 
that flows from the particular claims of the new urbanists. As 
discussed previously, the new urbanists argue that planning  
for density—or, at least their version of it, which  
focuses on encouraging and/or mandating mixed-land-use 
developments—holds promises beyond the economic, ecological, 
and distributional. Specifically, building upon Jane Jacobs’ claims 
about the communitarian benefits of the urban form, the new 
urbanists argue that planning for density will foster the social 
capital necessary to build thriving communities. 
The paradox of planning for density can be summarized in four 
words: “Was Jane Jacobs wrong?” Recall that Jane Jacobs argued 
that dense, mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods were safer and 
more socially cohesive than less populated, single-use ones.92 
These claims, which have been embraced with great gusto by the 
new urbanists, flowed from two convictions/predictions about the 
effects of density, especially of commercial land uses, on city life. 
First, she argued that mixed-land-use neighborhoods are safer 
than single-land-use ones.93 She intuited that, by drawing people 
into city streets, businesses generate “eyes upon the street” that 
keep disorder and crime in check.94 Indeed, she went so far as to 
argue that neighborhood bars could contribute to neighborhood 
security, reasoning that their patrons would serve a private 
surveillance function well into the night hours.95 Second, Jacobs 
argued that commercial land uses help build community by 
bringing together people who would not otherwise meet. Jacobs 
reasoned, “The trust of a city street is formed over time from 
many, many little public sidewalk contacts. It grows out of people 
stopping by at the bar for a beer, getting advice from the grocer 
and giving advice to the newsstand man . . . .”96 Drawing from 
Jacobs, the new urbanists assert that the single-land-use design of 
                                                                                                                                         
(noting that only twenty-nine percent of the communities that adopted form-based codes 
during or after 2007 have had projects built). 
92. See JACOBS, supra note 36, at 3–25. 
93. Id. at 36–37. 
94. Id. at 34–35 (“A well-used city street is apt to be a safe street. A deserted city 
street is apt to be unsafe.”). 
95. Id. at 40–41. 
96. Id. at 56. 
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suburbia deprives many Americans of the opportunity to build 
community and relationships with one another.97 Philip Langdon, 
for example, echoes Jacobs when he argues, “[T]he tavern, the cafe, 
the coffee shop, the neighborhood store . . . have been zoned out of 
residential areas . . . . As informal gathering places have been 
banished, many opportunities for making friendships and pursuing 
common interests have disappeared.”98 
Unfortunately, Jacobs’ arguments appear to be intuitively 
appealing but empirically unsustainable. The popular and 
academic commentary on Jacobs’ arguments almost entirely 
neglects to take into account the empirical literature testing and 
rejecting her hypotheses. These studies find instead that 
commercial land uses increase crime and disorder and suppress 
social capital.99 In a number of studies criminologists, sociologists, 
and environmental psychologists have examined the connection 
between land use patterns and disorder, crime, and “collective 
efficacy,” which sociologists and social psychologists define as the 
“ability of neighborhoods to realize the common goals of residents 
and maintain effective social control.”100 These studies test Jacobs’ 
claims by comparing the levels of crime, disorder, and social 
cohesion in exclusively residential and mixed-land-use 
neighborhoods.101 These studies generally find that exclusively 
                                                                                                                                         
97. ANDRES DUANY, ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBECK & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: 
THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 59–64 (2010) (“Americans 
are splintering into insular factions, each pursuing an increasingly narrow agenda, with 
nary a thought for the greater good. Further, more and more citizens seem to be 
withdrawing from public life into the shelter of their private homes . . . . [I]t is near-
impossible to imagine community independent of the town square or the local pub . . . . 
[P]edestrian life cannot exist in the absence of worthwhile destinations that are easily 
accessible on foot. This is a condition that modern suburbia fails to satisfy, since it strives to 
keep all commercial activity well separated from housing.”). 
98. PHILIP LANGDON, A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE: RESHAPING THE AMERICAN SUBURB 
15–16 (1994). 
99. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social 
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. 
SOC. 603, 624 (1999) (“Neighborhoods with mixed residential and commercial development 
exhibit higher levels of both physical and social disorder, regardless of sociodemographic 
characteristics.”). 
100. Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1604 
(2002). For a fuller discussion on collective efficacy and neighborhood health, see Sampson 
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residential neighborhoods have lower crime rates, less disorder, 
and more collective efficacy than mixed residential and commercial 
neighborhoods.102 
Researchers conducting these studies link their findings to the 
“routine activities” theory of crime.103 Routine activities theory 
builds on the insight that most predatory crime is opportunistic. 
As Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush summarize, 
“predatory crime involves the intersection in time and space of 
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable 
guardians.”104 Land use patterns are relevant to this thesis for two 
reasons. First, non-residential land uses (for example schools, 
stores, parks, etc.) may serve to invite would-be offenders into a 
neighborhood. Moreover, by providing places where individuals 
congregate, commercial land uses generate a larger pool of 
potential victims than residential ones. In other words, while 
Jacobs may have been right that commercial land uses increase 
the number of individuals present in an urban neighborhood, the 
routine activities theory suggests that higher numbers of “eyes 
upon the street” may increase the number of potential offenders, 
as well as the number of law-abiding crime monitors. 
Second, contrary to Jacobs’s intuition, commercial land uses 
decrease incentives for private surveillance efforts. Jacobs argued 
that outsiders as well as insiders to a community provide the “eyes 
upon the street” needed to suppress disorder and crime.105 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence suggests that the opposite is 
true. Strangers “invited” to a community by commercial land uses 
apparently act to decrease, rather than increase, the level of 
informal surveillance in a neighborhood. They also appear to 
reduce neighborhood social cohesion.106 Resident surveys 
conducted for the land use studies discussed above, however, 
suggest that commercial land uses reduce informal monitoring, 
because they reduce the sense in which residents consider it their 
“own;” perhaps, because commercial land uses generate foot traffic 
that makes it difficult for residents to discern between insiders 
and outsiders in a community.107 In one study, for example, 
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“[r]esidents on blocks with more nonresidential land  
use . . . recognized other on-block residents less well, felt that they 
had less control over events in the neighborhood, and were less 
likely to count on a neighbor to watch out for suspicious activity,” 
than residents of exclusively residential blocks.108 
Since most of my early scholarship might have been described 
as “Jane Jacobs on steroids,” these findings were initially 
devastating to me. I pondered them for years before I came to the 
conclusion that intellectual honestly demanded that I build a case 
for planning for density, rather than build a case for  
mixed-land-use planning, that tackles the uncomfortable reality 
that these empirical studies present. My case is built upon an 
apparent paradox, which I call the “People Paradox.” The People 
Paradox can be summarized as follows: In urban neighborhoods, 
people may not make us safer, but for a variety of reasons, they 
apparently make us feel safer. The empirical evidence suggests 
that, although we are not safer in busy places, we think that we 
are. That is, we feel safer in busy places. At least in urban 
neighborhoods, that is, we are afraid of being alone. We believe 
that there is safety in numbers. For a variety of reasons that I 
explore in detail in other work, we associate “aloneness” with 
vulnerability to crime.109 As Mark Warr, the author of one of the 
most systematic studies linking the fear of crime to the fear of 
being alone, has observed, “being alone in a truly dangerous 
environment is the stuff of nightmares.”110 
This People Paradox suggests that, even if the new urbanists’ 
project rests on a flawed intuition about the benefits of mixed-
land-use communities, we need not abandon efforts to plan for 
density. This is because fear of crime is at least as important a 
contributor to residential stability as crime itself—the two 
phenomena being related but distinct. Safety—reflected  
both in actual crime rates and the perceived risk of  
victimization—strongly influences residential location decisions. In 
his 1956 essay, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Charles 
Tiebout influentially hypothesized that municipalities compete for 
residents by offering different packages of public policies and 
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public goods.111 According to the Tiebout model, residents sort 
themselves within a metropolitan area according to their 
preferences for public goods and municipal services.112 The benefit 
of this sorting is that it drives efficiency by subjecting local 
governments to market competition.113 
Although Tiebout did not mention it specifically, safety 
undoubtedly is one of the public goods influencing residential 
sorting. The Tieboutian case for safe city neighborhoods is not 
merely a theoretical one. In one nationwide study, Julie Berry 
Cullen and Steven Levitt found a strong correlation between crime 
and urban flight. Each reported city crime correlated with a one-
person decline in city population; “[a] [ten percent] increase in 
crime correspond[ed] to a [one percent] decline in city 
population.”114 Cullen and Levitt also found that residents 
motivated to move by fear of crime were more likely to remain in 
the same metropolitan area than those moving for other reasons, 
which suggests that the fear of crime encourages residents to move 
to the suburbs. 115 And, importantly, even studies that question the 
connection between fear and migration to the suburbs suggest that 
crime exerts a relatively strong, and negative, influence on in-
migration—that is, on residents’ decision to move from the suburbs 
to the city.116 Moreover, while Cullen and Levitt’s study focused on 
the connection between crime and out-migration to suburbs, fear of  
crime undoubtedly also influences residents intra-locally as well, 
with safer neighborhoods enjoying greater residential stability 
than more dangerous ones.117 
This connection between fear of crime and residential stability 
is important because residential stability is strongly correlated 
with collective efficacy.118 Not surprisingly, neighborhoods with 
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high levels of collective efficacy are healthier than those with lower 
levels. Neighborhoods with low levels of collective efficacy exhibit 
more signs of social distress—for example, they are more 
dangerous and disorderly and residents are more fearful of 
victimization—than those with higher levels. In a major  
study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods, Robert Sampson, Stephen 
Raudenbush, and Felton Earls found that residential stability, 
measured by average residential tenure and levels of 
homeownership, was one of three major factors explaining 
neighborhood variation in collective efficacy, and that collective 
efficacy, in turn, mediated the negative effects of the other two 
factors—economic disadvantage and immigration—enough to 
reduce violent crime in a neighborhood.119 These findings are 
consistent with other social science research linking residential 
tenure and homeownership, especially of single-family homes, with 
high levels of collective efficacy.120 
 
V. CONCLUSION: THE PLANNING FOR DENSITY 
AND THE PEOPLE PARADOX 
 
Proponents tend to agree that the best way to secure the 
promises of planning for density is for residents to live—and 
developers to build—in built-up areas rather than in new suburbs 
on the outskirts of metropolitan regions. In other words, the 
primary goal of planning for density is urban redevelopment.121 
When considering what kinds of policies will advance that goal, it 
is important to acknowledge that Americans’ suburban affinities 
are not universally shared. Cities are not for everyone, to be sure. 
But they are for some people. Just as some people would, if given 
the opportunity, prefer to the live in suburbs—despite their many 
flaws—so also would many people prefer to live in cities—despite 
their many flaws. And, the way to increase the numbers of people 
who fall into the latter category is to embrace the People Paradox, 
which suggests busy-ness, not sterility, is what draws people to 
urban life. 
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The People Paradox also suggests partial solutions to the 
economic and distribution perils of planning for density—although 
these solutions are ones that many land use planners will find 
discomfiting. In my view, the best way to achieve density  
likely is persuasion, not coercion. The coercive tools in the  
planning-for-density toolkit promoted by environmentalists and 
regionalists seek to drive development back into urban centers by 
increasing the cost of suburban growth. But they do little to 
address myriad challenges to building healthy urban communities 
that would-be city dwellers, rich and poor, care about deeply. The 
form-based codes promoted by new urbanists offer expensive 
aesthetic micromanagement of those challenges. But if we really 
want to achieve the goal of density, the best way to do so is to 
reduce the costs of living in cities and the costs of development in 
cities. Coercive regulation will do neither. Furthermore, the People 
Paradox suggests that discussions of planning for density are all-
to-frequently divorced from the discussions of managing the effects 
of density. In particular, it suggests an overlooked connection 
between policing practices and land use policies, a subject beyond 
the scope of this Article about which I have written extensively 
on.122 
Finally, the people paradox suggests an overlooked connection 
between land use policy and education policy. As Joel Kotkin has 
observed, the young and hip may be attracted to busy cities, but 
most creative people are middle-aged and middle class—not young 
and hip. And middle-aged, middle class people continue to 
gravitate to suburbs for the same reasons that their parents did: 
schools. It is telling that, while many cities made a comeback in 
recent years, the comeback was primarily driven by young people 
and rich people. The population share of middle class families 
living in cities continues to decline. Addressing the affordability of 
urban life may be a necessary but not sufficient component of a 
strategy to retain middle class families; addressing the educational 
woes of urban schools is a critical component.123 But the perils and 
paradoxes of education reform strategies are a subject for another 
day. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
122. See sources cited supra note 7. 
123. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 201 (2010). 
24 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 33:1 
 
